Russell Martin’s Rangers have failed to win any of their first five Scottish Premiership games – despite his front-footed attacking style of play – and were humiliated in Champions League qualifying by Club Brugge.

Fans have protested against him before, during, and after matches, demanding his removal, and pundits have queried the former Swansea City and Southampton head coach’s approach.

Against that backdrop – and with Rangers sitting a staggering 11th in the Scottish top flight – BBC Sport have reviewed the opening matches of the season to try and analyse what Martin has been trying to do, why it hasn’t worked yet and how he is changing his style for the first time in his career.

Martin’s Rangers began looking like previous teams he’d managed. The league opener at Motherwell was a good example, with glimpses of impressive play.

When Motherwell took their goal kicks, Rangers’ attackers pushed high, applying a full press in a man-to-man fashion.

This approach forced Motherwell captain Paul McGinn to kick the ball out for a corner, from which Rangers’ ended up scoring.

On the ball, Rangers set up in a 4-3-3. When building out from the back, right back James Tavernier became a third central defender with left back Max Aarons holding his wide position.

As the ball moved up the pitch, the full-backs began taking inverted positions in midfield. The midfield three became a single defensive midfielder, and the two attacking midfielders were encouraged to move up the pitch.

Martin’s sides aim to play through the middle of the pitch before finding the wide players in space to attack.

The wingers, as a result, were tasked with staying high and wide, with the team looking to find them isolated against the opposition full-backs.

Historically, Martin’s teams have scored through allowing the wingers to express themselves in one-against-one situations, before shooting or cutting the ball back.

Martin’s insistence on short build-up play was seen, too. Passes were played at a quick pace, often in a one-touch manner. When this was executed properly, it allowed them to get up the pitch, bypassing Motherwell’s press.

Although the game ended in a draw, there were some promising signs.

The small weaknesses seen in this game were typical of Martin’s sides in the past, however, and have been amplified against better opposition.

Rangers have suffered for three main reasons.

The areas in which they’ve lost the ball have often been in the middle of the pitch, with the four defenders and holding midfielder often responsible for playing these difficult passes.

Losing the ball centrally increases the risk of conceding from a dangerous counter attack. Losing the ball in wide areas is less of a threat as the ball is further away from the goal and there is less space for opponents to operate in.

A second reason Rangers have suffered has been because of their ‘rest defence,’ a coaching term used to describe the number of players the team in possession has behind the ball, ready to defend if they lose it.

When Rangers have tried to force a pass forward, there have been numerous occasions in which they’ve only had three players back ready to defend.

The two central defenders and the defensive midfielder become stretched when the ball is lost and direct passes from opponents, down the middle, immediately create scenarios that Rangers have conceded from this season.

The central defenders have looked shaky at times defending one-against-one here but this is partly understandable given the situations they’ve found themselves in.

The final thing Martin has struggled with is where and how he has used individual players in his squad.

John Souttar has been deployed at both right and left centre back in alternating games. Aarons has played both right and left back.

Djeidi Gassama and Mikey Moore have both played on both wings. And Joe Rothwell has played as a single defensive midfielder despite being deployed next to a holding midfielder at times for Leeds United last season.

Questions can be raised about his tactical decisions but Martin has found relative success with this approach at points throughout his career.

The main factor that results in a tactical plan succeeding or failing is often the quality of player at a manager’s disposal.

Players need to be able to execute the instructions being asked of them. They ideally need to be in familiar roles that get them into zones on the pitch they’re comfortable in, too, and sometimes that requires a manager to tweak his approach.

Signs of this being addressed were seen in last Saturday’s game against Hibernian – only Rangers’ second domestic win.

The full-backs played wider, Gassama and Moore were used as wingers that could move inside and Nicolas Raskin was responsible for playing some of those more difficult central passes.

The 6-0 defeat by Club Brugge was a significant turning moment.

That annihilation was followed by games against Celtic and Hearts, currently the top two in the league, and for those Martin changed his system for the first time in his entire managerial career.

In his first job as manager of MK Dons, he lost his first four games and even then he refused to change.

In an interview with the Coaches’ Voice in 2023, he said: “I’d said to the [MK Dons] players from the off that we weren’t going to be outcome-based. We were going to focus on each step, each game, getting closer to the team we wanted to be.

“On all the courses I have done, every manager who came in and spoke said one of the regrets they had was changing or going away from what they thought was important because of the pressure they felt when results weren’t going well.

“If I was going to get sacked, I wanted to get sacked doing something I believed in.”

These are telling quotes from a coach who has stuck by them throughout even periods that have led to sackings.

The fact Martin has moved away from the philosophy he has stuck by for so many years perhaps illustrates just how much pressure he is under at Ibrox.

In the last two league games, he has adopted a 4-2-3-1 shape with summer signings Aarons and Rothwell left out. In front of the defence sits a more positionally-strict and industrial midfield duo.

Martin would typically ask his full-backs and attacking midfielders to get up the pitch, overloading the midfield and wide areas in attack, but in recent games there has been a reluctance in committing players to attack.

In build-up, Tavernier still forms a back three with the centre backs but there is more support centrally from the midfield. The keeper and defenders have been more willing to punt it up the pitch, too.

These appear to be pragmatic changes that stray away from a Martin side.

And looking at the league data before and after the Club Brugge loss highlights how stark the change in style has been.

You have to take into account the quality of the opposition but possession is down from 70% to almost 50%, with Rangers spending longer defending deeper and there has been an increase in how often they have gone long.

They are also however facing fewer shots and the plan appears to have been put in place to solidify the team in the face of conceding big chances.

It is however hindering their attacking play, with the amount of shots they are taking per game almost half of what they were previously.

A recent Jose Mourinho quote touched upon the idea of managers having a set style of play.

“We’re in a generation where we see coaches trying to do things that just don’t work and they die,” he said. “But they say, ‘I died, but I died with my idea.’ My friend, if you died by your ideas, you are stupid.”

With football being a business based on results, this perhaps harsh assessment is probably fair. The best coaches however adapt within their general framework rather than scrapping what they believe in altogether.

Given the poor results thus far, was there a need for Martin to change things? Of course, and he deserves some credit for doing so.

But adapting to the quality of his players whilst retaining his principles – although easier said than done – might have been a more ideal fix in the short term.

After all, there were genuinely good things about his style of play in a few of the earlier games.

Such a drastic and sudden change in his approach is likely a last-ditch move in order to salvage more time.

It has worked for coaches in the past but this more pragmatic style of play has to deliver wins now or there are neither short nor long-term benefits to it.

Russell Martin’s Rangers have failed to win any of their first five Scottish Premiership games – despite his front-footed attacking style of play – and were humiliated in Champions League qualifying by Club Brugge.

Fans have protested against him before, during, and after matches, demanding his removal, and pundits have queried the former Swansea City and Southampton head coach’s approach.

Against that backdrop – and with Rangers sitting a staggering 11th in the Scottish top flight – BBC Sport have reviewed the opening matches of the season to try and analyse what Martin has been trying to do, why it hasn’t worked yet and how he is changing his style for the first time in his career.

Martin’s Rangers began looking like previous teams he’d managed. The league opener at Motherwell was a good example, with glimpses of impressive play.

When Motherwell took their goal kicks, Rangers’ attackers pushed high, applying a full press in a man-to-man fashion.

This approach forced Motherwell captain Paul McGinn to kick the ball out for a corner, from which Rangers’ ended up scoring.

On the ball, Rangers set up in a 4-3-3. When building out from the back, right back James Tavernier became a third central defender with left back Max Aarons holding his wide position.

As the ball moved up the pitch, the full-backs began taking inverted positions in midfield. The midfield three became a single defensive midfielder, and the two attacking midfielders were encouraged to move up the pitch.

Martin’s sides aim to play through the middle of the pitch before finding the wide players in space to attack.

The wingers, as a result, were tasked with staying high and wide, with the team looking to find them isolated against the opposition full-backs.

Historically, Martin’s teams have scored through allowing the wingers to express themselves in one-against-one situations, before shooting or cutting the ball back.

Martin’s insistence on short build-up play was seen, too. Passes were played at a quick pace, often in a one-touch manner. When this was executed properly, it allowed them to get up the pitch, bypassing Motherwell’s press.

Although the game ended in a draw, there were some promising signs.

The small weaknesses seen in this game were typical of Martin’s sides in the past, however, and have been amplified against better opposition.

Rangers have suffered for three main reasons.

The areas in which they’ve lost the ball have often been in the middle of the pitch, with the four defenders and holding midfielder often responsible for playing these difficult passes.

Losing the ball centrally increases the risk of conceding from a dangerous counter attack. Losing the ball in wide areas is less of a threat as the ball is further away from the goal and there is less space for opponents to operate in.

A second reason Rangers have suffered has been because of their ‘rest defence,’ a coaching term used to describe the number of players the team in possession has behind the ball, ready to defend if they lose it.

When Rangers have tried to force a pass forward, there have been numerous occasions in which they’ve only had three players back ready to defend.

The two central defenders and the defensive midfielder become stretched when the ball is lost and direct passes from opponents, down the middle, immediately create scenarios that Rangers have conceded from this season.

The central defenders have looked shaky at times defending one-against-one here but this is partly understandable given the situations they’ve found themselves in.

The final thing Martin has struggled with is where and how he has used individual players in his squad.

John Souttar has been deployed at both right and left centre back in alternating games. Aarons has played both right and left back.

Djeidi Gassama and Mikey Moore have both played on both wings. And Joe Rothwell has played as a single defensive midfielder despite being deployed next to a holding midfielder at times for Leeds United last season.

Questions can be raised about his tactical decisions but Martin has found relative success with this approach at points throughout his career.

The main factor that results in a tactical plan succeeding or failing is often the quality of player at a manager’s disposal.

Players need to be able to execute the instructions being asked of them. They ideally need to be in familiar roles that get them into zones on the pitch they’re comfortable in, too, and sometimes that requires a manager to tweak his approach.

Signs of this being addressed were seen in last Saturday’s game against Hibernian – only Rangers’ second domestic win.

The full-backs played wider, Gassama and Moore were used as wingers that could move inside and Nicolas Raskin was responsible for playing some of those more difficult central passes.

The 6-0 defeat by Club Brugge was a significant turning moment.

That annihilation was followed by games against Celtic and Hearts, currently the top two in the league, and for those Martin changed his system for the first time in his entire managerial career.

In his first job as manager of MK Dons, he lost his first four games and even then he refused to change.

In an interview with the Coaches’ Voice in 2023, he said: “I’d said to the [MK Dons] players from the off that we weren’t going to be outcome-based. We were going to focus on each step, each game, getting closer to the team we wanted to be.

“On all the courses I have done, every manager who came in and spoke said one of the regrets they had was changing or going away from what they thought was important because of the pressure they felt when results weren’t going well.

“If I was going to get sacked, I wanted to get sacked doing something I believed in.”

These are telling quotes from a coach who has stuck by them throughout even periods that have led to sackings.

The fact Martin has moved away from the philosophy he has stuck by for so many years perhaps illustrates just how much pressure he is under at Ibrox.

In the last two league games, he has adopted a 4-2-3-1 shape with summer signings Aarons and Rothwell left out. In front of the defence sits a more positionally-strict and industrial midfield duo.

Martin would typically ask his full-backs and attacking midfielders to get up the pitch, overloading the midfield and wide areas in attack, but in recent games there has been a reluctance in committing players to attack.

In build-up, Tavernier still forms a back three with the centre backs but there is more support centrally from the midfield. The keeper and defenders have been more willing to punt it up the pitch, too.

These appear to be pragmatic changes that stray away from a Martin side.

And looking at the league data before and after the Club Brugge loss highlights how stark the change in style has been.

You have to take into account the quality of the opposition but possession is down from 70% to almost 50%, with Rangers spending longer defending deeper and there has been an increase in how often they have gone long.

They are also however facing fewer shots and the plan appears to have been put in place to solidify the team in the face of conceding big chances.

It is however hindering their attacking play, with the amount of shots they are taking per game almost half of what they were previously.

A recent Jose Mourinho quote touched upon the idea of managers having a set style of play.

“We’re in a generation where we see coaches trying to do things that just don’t work and they die,” he said. “But they say, ‘I died, but I died with my idea.’ My friend, if you died by your ideas, you are stupid.”

With football being a business based on results, this perhaps harsh assessment is probably fair. The best coaches however adapt within their general framework rather than scrapping what they believe in altogether.

Given the poor results thus far, was there a need for Martin to change things? Of course, and he deserves some credit for doing so.

But adapting to the quality of his players whilst retaining his principles – although easier said than done – might have been a more ideal fix in the short term.

After all, there were genuinely good things about his style of play in a few of the earlier games.

Such a drastic and sudden change in his approach is likely a last-ditch move in order to salvage more time.

It has worked for coaches in the past but this more pragmatic style of play has to deliver wins now or there are neither short nor long-term benefits to it.

A 64-team World Cup?

The concept will sound like a step too far to some, but others believe it deserves real consideration.

In April, the South American governing body Conmebol raised an official proposal to expand the 2030 tournament to 64 teams, and Fifa will discuss it with leaders from the continent in New York this week.

The first 48-team World Cup will take place next summer across the United States, Canada and Mexico – expanded from the current 32-team format – but there are serious attempts from some to make it even bigger for 2030.

That tournament will be the first to be spread across three continents to mark its 100-year anniversary, with main hosts Spain, Morocco and Portugal being joined by Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay in hosting opening-round matches.

But is the World Cup about to make more history? BBC Sport looks at whether a 64-team tournament could really happen and what it might look like.

So, what is going on?

The idea was first “spontaneously raised” at a Fifa council meeting in March by Uruguayan Football Federation president Ignacio Alonso.

It was then presented at Fifa congress in April by Conmebol, which believes it would be a fitting way to mark the World Cup’s centenary.

Fifa’s official position has always been it will discuss expansion ideas with its stakeholders and it is duty bound to consider any proposals from its council members.

The Fifa council would make the ultimate decision, but there are no signs it is something expected to be made imminently.

How dramatic would this expansion actually be?

Fairly seismic is the obvious answer.

The pace of change has been remarkable, since the long-standing 16-team format increased to 24 teams in 1982.

It became a 32-team event in 1998 before being expanded to 48 teams for next summer’s showpiece.

Adding another 16 teams for 2030 would mean the World Cup had doubled in size in eight years and would mean more than 30% of Fifa’s current 211 members would participate.

Fifa president Gianni Infantino said “every idea is a good idea”, but the proposal for a 64-team tournament has divided opinion among the six Fifa confederations and national associations.

Conmebol president Alejandro Dominguez said expanding the World Cup for its centenary would ensure “nobody on the planet is left out of the party”.

Uefa president Aleksander Ceferin is among those to have dismissed the proposals, with the Slovenian saying it is a “bad idea” for both the tournament itself and the qualifying process.

Victor Montagliani, president of the governing body for football in North and Central America and the Caribbean (Concacaf), said the suggestion “doesn’t feel right” and believes the expansion would damage “the broader football ecosystem”.

Asian Football Confederation (AFC) president Sheikh Salman bin Ibrahim Al Khalifa agreed, saying further expansion would bring “chaos”.

While there has been limited further public discussion, there are a few obvious reasons why people would be in favour and against the proposal.

Financially, more games would surely mean bigger TV deals and sponsorship possibilities.

The expanded 2026 format is already predicted to be generating more money than any previous World Cup through sponsorships, merchandising, ticket sales and broadcast revenues, with Fifa expecting to earn $11bn (£8.2bn) over the four-year cycle to December 2026.

By flinging its doors open wider than ever before, the tournament would be more inclusive and the change would probably result in a host of nations reaching the World Cup for the first time.

At the 2022 World Cup, hosts Qatar were the only team making their tournament debut.

Cape Verde are only one win away from joining already-qualified Jordan and Uzbekistan as debutants at the 2026 competition, while New Caledonia and Suriname could add to the growing number of debutants already in next summer’s World Cup.

A 64-team tournament would also increase the likelihood of all the world’s top players competing.

On the flip side, the competitive nature of the event would be brought into question. The potential for one-sided matches would increase, while qualifying would become even more a foregone conclusion for many nations than it is already.

Questions will be asked about the added amount of travel that players and fans will have to make, with sustainability likely to be an important issue with the increased number of flights needed to transport teams, fans and media.

This is a difficult question to answer.

The notion of a 64-team tournament is almost unprecedented in top-level international sport, so it is difficult to cite any examples.

Next summer’s expanded format is complicated enough, with the top two and best eight third-place finishers from 12 groups of four qualifying for the last 32.

The obvious structure for a 64-team World Cup in 2030 would be for the top two from 16 groups of four to qualify for the last 32. Perhaps a bit tidier than next years?

Should the proposal eventually be accepted, the 2030 edition would include 128 matches – up from the 64-game format played between 1998 and 2022.

Next year’s World Cup will have 104 matches and will take 72 games – eight games more than an entire 32-team World Cup – just to get down to 32 teams.

From the start of the 2026 tournament until the end of the last 16 there will be 96 games across 27 days, with no rest day.

Just one of those days will feature a single match, and just two days will have only two matches. The remaining 24 days will feature three, four or even six matches.

Therefore, the impact of another 16 teams joining the fray is rather mind-boggling.

How would they fit in the extra matches?

Fifa has already stated the 2030 finals will run from 8 June, with the final on 21 July, and the possibility of making the tournament longer would seem unlikely with the footballing calendar already more tightly packed than many would like.

This would mean the need for more games per day in the group stages and thus extra stadiums would have to be considered.

There have been suggestions Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay could host more games during these group stages.

And what would the impact be on qualifying?

For starters, it would be almost inconceivable that the world’s top football nations would not qualify for the World Cup.

While Italy are currently preparing to sit out a third consecutive World Cup, such shock scenarios, which are all part of the drama, are hard to envisage should a 64-team tournament become a reality.

Conmebol could already see a maximum of seven teams qualify for next summer’s event, and they would clearly want more members qualifying for an expanded tournament.

All other continents would also be expected to have more qualifying spots, but the logistics around this are purely guesswork for now.

The mere potential of a 64-team World Cup has raised plenty of questions – as well as eyebrows. Whether it gets off the ground or not remains to be seen, a matter for sporting and political power-brokers to figure out.